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Abstract. Credit cards have many important benefits; however, these same bene-
fits often carry with them many privacy concerns. In particular, the need for users
to be able to monitor their own transactions, as well as bank’s need to justify its
payment requests from cardholders, entitle the latter to maintain a detailed log of
all transactions its credit card customers were involved in. A bank can thus build
a profile of each cardholder even without the latter’s consent. In this paper, we
present a practical and accountable anonymous credit system based on ecash ,
with a privacy preserving mechanism for error correction and expense-reporting.
1 Introduction
Motivation: Credit Cards vs. Consumer’s Privacy. Credit cards have many
useful properties. Apart permitting delayed payment, they provide users with
logs of their own transactions, receipts, and the opportunity to challenge and cor-
rect erroneous charges. However, these same benefits are a privacy risk: banks
can use the same information to build and sell profiles of their customers. We
need a system that preserves the benefits of credit cards without violating users’
privacy.
In the context of e-commerce, privacy of an entity is being able to trans-
act with other entities without any unauthorized outsider being able to acquire
any transaction-related information. In addition, no party should be able to build
profiles of any other party based on purchases without the latter’s consent. Being
closely related to their owners’identities, credit cards’ extended use constitutes a
serious threat to consumers’ privacy: Frequent occurrences of credit card losses,
credit card number based-impersonation attacks as well as human nature er-
rors, i.e. overcharge of a client, make it necessary for cardholders to be able to
monitor their own transaction activity and for merchants to provide banks with
detailed description of each credit card transaction. Under the umbrella of the
need of immediate charge justification/correction, each bank, which is no more
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trusted than the people operating it, acquires a global view of its customers’
transaction activity. None of the currently deployed credit card systems offer
consumer’s privacy towards banks. Given the fact that the percentage of credit
card-based purchases is increasing, a deployable privacy preserving credit card
system has become quite important. This is the problem we have solved.
Privacy Preserving Payment Mechanisms. A very detailed report on the state
of the art of electronic payment systems was first done by Asokan e.t.l. in
[AJSW99]. [K99] and [BBG+00] are credit card related protocols securing or
blinding credit card information from third parties or merchant respectively but
not towards banks. Credit Cards providing cardholder anonymity even towards
the banks were introduced in 1994 by Low etl. [LPM94]. However, their scheme
involves many trusted parties and offers no expense report or error correction
service. Current schemes have some of the privacy problems mentioned earlier:
Ecash. Ecash [CHL05,DCN90] is a substitute of money on the Internet which
cannot be faked, copied or spent more than once. It is known to provide abso-
lute anonymity, namely no one can relate a particular ecash coin (ecoin ) with
its owner. One would argue that ecash could solve the problem we described
before. Consumers can indeed buy anonymous ecoins from a bank/mint and
use them in their online transactions. [B95] is a ecash based electronic payment
system taking in consideration real world system threats. However, ecash is a
prepayment based — as opposed to the most popular credit based — scheme,
and used strictly for online transactions; additionally, the complete anonymity it
guarantees gives no opportunities for error correction or expense reporting.
Anonymous Debit Cards(ADCs). Anonymous Debit Cards are prepaid ecash -
based cards, which are recharged by cardholders and used to pay for goods
anonymously. However, their use is very limited; among the reasons are the
lack of error correction and proof of purchase mechanisms; additionally, they
operate in a debit rather than a credit fashion, i.e. the amount of money paid by
it, is subtracted from one’s account, when the card is initially obtained.
Our Contribution. In this paper we introduce a privacy-preserving credit card
mechanism which can be applied in current credit card systems. In particular,
we present a realizable protocol to support “credit card”-based online and offline
transactions, in which banks, unless authorized by the cardholder, do not acquire
any knowledge of their customers’ transactions. At the same time, cardholders
are provided with detailed reports regarding their purchases and may participate
on any type of merchant credit card offers. For the purposes of our system, we
made use of a combination of two types of the compact ecash [CHL05] scheme
for payments, and a combination of blind [CL02] and plain digital signatures
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for the rest of our system’s operations.
In the following sections we will briefly present our system’s main functions.
For space reasons, we have put the more detailed presentation of all the services
provided by our scheme in [AB09].
2 System Architecture
A typical credit card mechanism consists of cardholders (consumers), merchants
(sellers), Card Issuing Banks, Acquiring Banks and Credit Card Associations.
When eligible to receive a credit card, a consumer applies to a Card Issuing
Bank she maintains an account with. The Card Issuing Bank bills the card-
holders for payment and bears the risk of fraudulent use of the card. On the
other hand, Merchants, who are eligible to receive credit card payments, are in
agreement with an Acquiring Bank authorized to receive payments on their be-
half. Banks are organized in Credit Card Associations (such as Visa R© or Master
Card R©) that set the transaction rules between Card Issuing and Acquiring Banks.
For convenience, in the following sections, we will refer to a merchant as
‘he’, to a client as ‘she’ and to any type of Bank as ‘it’. In addition, we will use
the following acronyms: CIB for Card Issuing Bank, AB for Acquiring Bank,
ACCA for our Anonymous Credit Card Association and ACC for Anonymous
Credit Card.
As we aim to create a realizable system, we assume that our adversary has
all the powers and motives real Banks/merchants/cardholders or groups of them
would have. In addition, we assume that all parties have as main objective to
increase their profit and would not act against it. More specifically:
a. All of banks are “honest but curious”: they are trusted to do their functional
operations correctly, but they may collude with each other or with merchants
and combine the information they possess to track their customers’ activities.
b. Merchants are mostly interested in receiving their payment. However, they
may try to “deceive” a cardholder into making her pay more. For advertising
purposes, merchants may be motivated — if cost effective — to collaborate with
banks to profile their customers. In offline transactions the merchant knows the
customer’s face. However, any attempt to identify a customer manually (i.e. by
comparing pictures online) is not cost effective and is thus highly unlikely.
c. Cardholders may try to “cheat”, i.e. not to pay a merchant, to forge an ACC,
or perhaps to frame another customer by accusing her of having cheated.
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3 Requirements
Privacy and the rest of our system requirements will be presented in this section.
For simplicity (and since we assumed collaboration between banks), we will re-
fer to all of them as a united organization, a general Bank.
Privacy. Given a simple (online) cardholder-merchant transaction, no unautho-
rized third party — including the bank — should be able to gain any informa-
tion regarding that particular transaction or link it to a particular cardholder even
with merchant’s collaboration (We call this Customer Anonymity w.r.t bank and
the merchant). In addition, linking different ACC-based transactions as having
been done by the same cardholder should be impossible (Transaction Unlink-
ability). However, we require that the privacy provided in our system is condi-
tional: guaranteed for honest cardholders, but immediately revoked for dishon-
est ones.
As mentioned before, one of our fundamental requirements is the system’s
Deployability, i.e. our protocols should be usable with the current credit card
systems’ architecture as described in the previous section. Credit Card Un-
forgeability and non-Transferability are also required; our cards should not be
forgeable or usable by any third party. It should be possible for cardholders to
track their transactions (Expense Report Service) and provide an undeniable
proof of any mischarge (Error Correction Service) without endangering their
privacy. Privacy-preserving Loss Recovery of the card and Special payment
rate offers should be supported.
4 Anonymous Credit Card System
A credit mechanism can be viewed as a long term loan. The cardholder is cred-
ited the amount she borrows to transact, while credit limit Lcredit is the highest
loan balance that is authorized. To avoid charges for a more than she has spent,
the customer is required — at the end of each month — to provide undeniable
proof of the amount of money she has spent within that month. In this section
we will provide a brief presentation (see [AB09] for more details) of the most
important services of our system: ACC payment, Merchant payment, Loss re-
covery, and Expense report service.
Payments are realized through the use of two types of ecash -wallets pre-
sented at [CHL05] withdrawn at the ACC Issue procedure: the payment wallet
Wp, which — if spent more than its value — reveals the cardholder’s identity
and the identity wallet Wid, which — if overspent — reveals the entire trans-
action activity of the double-spender. The two wallets have an equal number of
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electronic coins (ecoins), which is proportional to the cardholder’s credit limit
Lcredit. To enforce different privacy levels, various combinations of these wal-
lets’ spendings are used in the ACC-payment procedure, where the product value
is spent from both wallets; in ACC-loss recovery, where only Wp is used; and in
ACC-monthly payment calculation, where only Wid is used. To get paid, mer-
chants simply deposit the ecash they receive, while blind signature schemes
[JLO97,LR98,O06] are used for the different types of market offers.
In what follows we will use [B]SigC(Msg) ([B]SigHC(Msg)) to denote the
[blind] signature of C on Msg (H(Msg)) and {Msg}K to denote encryption of
Msg under key K. For efficiency, every asymmetric encryption is inducted to a
symmetric one: {Msg}PK denotes {K}PK ||{Msg}K for a random K.
Setup. CIBs maintain a large database consisting of their customers’ account
information: Ddebit, for customers’ debit accounts, Dcredit for credit accounts,
Danon, for temporary anonymous accounts used only in online ACC transac-
tions, and Dhist which is used as a log of Dcredit and Danon. ABs, which may or
may not be CIBs, are linked to merchants’ debit accounts.
In addition to the signature key pair (pksB, sk
s
B) which identifies it, each
CIB carries out the appropriate setup process to support the two compact ecash
schemes in [CHL05]. The ACCA chooses and publishes (online) transaction-
related hashes (Hot) Ht and Hr.
Merchants and Cardholders are identified by the signature keys they use
when opening an account with a bank B. Each party collaborates with B to is-
sue a digital signature key-pair (pksx, sk
s
x), where x = M or C. Each merchant M
also obtains a validity certificate CredM = SigB(pksM). Customer’s C signature
key-pair, (pksC, sk
s
C), is strongly connected with her transaction activity; a part
of it is revealed when C misbehaves.1
ACC Issue. (Cardholder C–CIB CIB interaction) A CIB CIB and its customer
C collaborate so that the latter can withdraw from the Lcredit-size payment Wp
and identity Wid wallets. It is a typical withdrawal of the two ecash schemes
in [CHL05], for which C provides her sksC-related password, passpin. Public
information regarding the banks participating in ACCA (params) is also stored
in ACC.
C also chooses a set of passwords: a backup passe password, from which
her backup encryption key pair (pkeC, sk
e














and (pkecC , sk
ec
C ) that serve for encryption of transaction, wallet and coupon part
1 In reality, there are two key-pairs issued by C; each is indicative of C and corresponds to the




of the card, as we will describe later on. C also agrees on two hashes, HK and
HCB , with B.
Offline Payment. (ACC–merchant machine interaction) Merchant M provides
CredM to the cardholder C, who checks its validity using params. M provides
C with (CredM, Tdet, SigHtM{Tdet}), where Tdet is the transaction information,
including price and date. C enters her passwe to have her Wp and Wid wallets
decrypted, verifies the product information and inserts her passpin to spend
price value from both wallets. Let W ′p and W ′id be the remaining wallets. C is
immediately provided a printed transaction record. A merchant-signed receipt,









C ) to encrypt W
′
p
and W ′id into EWp,id .
To receive his payment, M deposits to his AB (AB) the ecoins he has re-
ceived from his customers. In particular, AB contacts each customer’s CIB to
validate each pair of payment-identity ecoins deposited by M. If everything is
fine, both banks make the required transfers to M’s account. On the other hand,
if a cardholder C tries to use her ACC to spend more than Lcredit value, i.e. if
a double-spending occurs, the owner of the card is identified through the ecash
anonymity revocability properties. If the latter is the case, all the ecoins the dis-
honest C withdrew are blacklisted.
Online Payment is performed in two stages:
Anonymous Account Setup.(ACC–ATM interaction) Cardholder C spends to her
CIB (CIB) Mot value from her Wp, Wid wallets, where Mot is the amount to be
spent online. To refer to Mot, C chooses m, Rot, hashes Hot and Hα and a
pseudonym key-pair (pkPC , sk
P




ot (Rot) and sends to
CIB the message:
{AmC ,m,Hot, Hα, pkPC }.
CIB updates Danon with
αC(m) = {AmC , Hot,Mot,m,Hα, pkPC }
and sends a confirmation to C RecαC(m) =
SigCIBot(H
r(αC(m)), date). AmC will be the initial number of the anonymous
account created and m is the upper bound of the number of transactions C can
participate in using the online account she created.
Transaction Payment. (Cardholder C–gateway G online interaction) The card-
holder C provides the merchant’s (M) website or the gateway G behind it with:
InfoCIB = {{CredM, Tdet, Am−1C }Kα , AmC }{pkeCIB
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where CredM is M’s credential, Tdet the transaction details andKα = Hα(AmC ))
is a key derived from C-chosenHα andAmC . BothA
m−1
C andKα are used for au-
thentication purposes; the owner ofAmC account is the only one who knowsHot,
Hα and AmC ’s pre-image. G sends InfoCIB,CredM and Tdet to C’s CIB (CIB) for
it to check the AmC ’s validity and balance. CIB sends G either a payment check
PaymCIB→AB for merchant’s AB (AB) or a signed rejection message RejCIB in
case of error. All messages are signed and contain Tdet and timestamps to avoid
confusion and replay attacks. G forwards PaymCIB→AB to AB and acknowledges
CIB with
RecT = SigHrG (CredM, Tdet − fin)
.CIB updatesDhist withRecT and substitutesαC(m)Danonentry withαC(m− 1),
where the Mot is reduced by price or not depending on whether CIB accepted
or rejected the request. To close the entry in Danon, C, in an ACC-ATM inter-
action, demonstrates knowledge of RecαC(m) and her ACC context is updated
accordingly.
ACC BackUp - Loss Recovery. (Cardholder C–CIB CIB in-person interaction)
ACC BackUp. Cardholder C generates a random number Nb and sends to her
CIB CIB
{Nb}pkeC——{ACCcontent——date− time}K
whereACContent is the content of the ACC, date− time is the backup times-
tamp and K = HK(Nb, passpin) is a symmetric encryption key, which only C
may derive givenNb.BackUp is hashed and signed by both parties for integrity
purposes into BackUpx = SigHCBx (BackUp), x = {C,B}. CIB updates Dhist.
Loss Recovery. Cardholder C is provided by her CIB CIB with the most recent
BackUp of her ACC,BackUp. C verifies thatBackUpmatches the most recent
BackUpB of her and spends to the latter the BackUp’s remaining payment
wallet (W ′p). CIB credits C’s entry in Dcredit for the amount spent till BackUp
was taken (Lcredit - |W ′p|, where |W ′p| are the remaining value (ecoins)of W ′p.
When merchants’ deposit ends, CIB updates C’s credit entry with any double-
spent payment-ecoin indicating C’s pkC. In this way, we cover the case where
BackUp is not up-to-date with the most recent transactions of C without skC
being revoked. Based on current Dcredit Centry, CIB and C collaborate to issue
an ACC with the new or different credit limit.
Monthly Payment Calculation. (CardholderC–CIB in-person interaction) Card-
holder C proves to CIB the amount of money she has spent throughout the past
month month. To calculate C’s monthly payment, C’s CIB, CIB, applies the for-
mula used in current Credit Card Systems on C’s overall credits.
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After decrypting (via passwe ) the remaining of her Wid wallet (W
′
id), C in-
teracts with CIB to spend it entirely. The amount of ecoins spent by C through
the past month is Lcredit - |Wid′| and CIBcan now estimate the monthly payment
for C. If C is still eligible for an ACC, she interacts with CIB to issue a new Wid
and additional Wp according to C’s new credit limit. Any attempt on C’s part
to lie for the remaining Wid wallet, e.g., by presenting a former version of her
ACC, would reveal sksC since a part of Wid will be spent twice.
Expense Report. For offline transactions or for online transactions of deacti-
vated anonymous accounts, C decrypts ET idet parts of her ACC to obtain the
detailed chain of her transactions. For online transactions referring to active
anonymous accounts, C in an ACC-ATM interaction with CIB, sends through
her sends a InfoCIB message with expense report request message instead of
Tdet. CIB sends back the corresponding report and updates Danon accordingly.
See [AB09] for more details.
Error Correction.(Cardholder C–ACCA/Merchant in-person interaction) If an
error has occurred, e.g., a mischarge by M, C contacts the ACCA and provides
it with RecT. ACCA contacts M, who may accept (RefM) or reject (RejM) the
refund-request (see [AB09]). If M accepts, the ACCA sends RefM to M’s AB,
AB, to verify M’s account balance. AB provides ACCA the actual payment,
which is forwarded to C’s CIB CIB. C deposits to CIB an ACCA-issued digital
check, RefCoupACCA→C, to receive the payments in the form of wallets. In case
of purchase cancellation, if M accepts the return of the product, it provides C
with RefM, which C deposits to her CIB.
ACC Promotion Offers These offers involve discounts or better credit card in-
terest rates, when a carholder makes many purchases from particular merchants.
This option is supported by our system through the use of blind coupons only
offer-eligible merchants may issue. However, as it does not constitute a core
attribute of a credit card system and because of space limitations, we will not
elaborate on it here. See [AB09] for details.
5 Other System Considerations
We will now outline particular system issues. See [AB09] for a full discussion.
Cardholder Anonymity - Transaction Unlinkability. Both of them are satis-
fied through ecash anonymity and unlinkability properties [CHL05]. As every
payment procedure (including the anonymous account setup) consists of two
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typical ecash spending procedures from the Wp and Wid wallets, they thus
cannot be linked to the cardholder C who used the ACC or to any other trans-
action from the same wallets (ACC). However, the anonymity provided is con-
ditional: if C tries to spend more ecoins than her Lcredit, i.e., the initial amount
of ecoins in each wallet, or lie at the monthly payment calculation procedure
for the amount she has spent, a part of Wid will inevitably be double-spent, and
— through anonymity revocability and traceability property of the Wid ecash
scheme [CHL05] — sksC will be revealed; all the ecoins withdrawn by C will
then be traced.
There are two cases in which we accept a small breach in a cardholder’s
anonymity or transaction unlinkability: (a) in Loss Recovery and (b) in Online
Payment. In the Loss Recovery process — an unusual situation — when the
most recent BackUp is not up-to-date, a cardholder C inevitably doublespends
a part of her Wp wallet: to the merchants she interacted and to her CIB, CIB.
pksC is then revealed and CIB knows whom C interacted with. However, this
anonymity breach becomes less important since we require that backups are
taken regularly. In the Online Payment case, CIB can obviously trace what type
of transactions a particular anonymous account is involved in through Dhist.
However, thanks to the unlinkability property of the ecash spent at the anony-
mous account setup phase, linking that profile to a particular identity is impos-
sible. In any case, the cardholder may open as many anonymous accounts she
wishes, in order to avoid transaction linkability.
Security of Online Transactions. Customer C authentication is achieved via
(a) the passpin C enters to setup the AmC anonymous account and through (b)
demonstration of knowledge of Hot, Hα and AmC ’s pre-image w.r.t. Hot. On the
other hand, the signed endorsement RecAmC
provided by C’s CIB, CIB, at the
αC(m) setup phase prevents CIB from cheating. As Tdet and CredM are part of
InfoCIB, i.e., encrypted with Kα, a key only CIB and C may derive, G cannot lie
about the price of C’s intended purchase (price) or M. In addition, as timestamps
are included in every message and account numbers change in every authorized
request, replay attacks or offline account guessing attacks cannot succeed.
On the other hand, C cannot use the same account for purchases of value
more than Mot: if she tries to spend the same part of her wallets in offline pur-
chases, her identity will be revoked while if the account balance is less than
price, she will receive a CIB signed rejection message. In addition to the mea-
sures mentioned before, we assume that there is an upper bound for Mot and
that the latter is spent within a particular time interval to reduce the amount of
transaction-wise information bound to each anonymous account.
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Authorized Anonymity Revocation. This is the case where a cardholder C is a
suspect of a offense and a judge requests a detailed description of that C’s ACC
related transactions. In our system, this can be achieved only with C’s consent.
a. Cis asked to provide sksC for all her transactions to be revealed, which we
want to avoid. b. Cis asked to enter her passte to decrypt the transaction related
part of her ACC and “spend” the rest of her Wp to CIB. Transaction details of
each transaction are signed by a merchant or C’s CIB (CIB) — in the case of
Anonymous Account Setup — and, thus, cannot be forged. To check for any
deceptive deletion of a transaction on cardholder’s side, CIB may use Dhist to
check whether the overall amount spent matches the aggregated amount in the
backed-up transaction details.
ACC Unforgeability is satisfied through the Correctness and Unforgeability
properties of the underlying ecash schemes. ACC non-Transferability is also
satisfied since sksC is required for the card to be used in both offline and online
purchases.
Bank Dishonesty. BackUpB is used to avoid any attempt of a CIB to trick a
cardholder into tracing more of the latter’s transactions: Assuming the CIB pro-
vided a less recent backup, then a bigger part of Wp would be double-spent and
more merchants would be directly linked to the cardholder. BackUpB will act
as an undeniable proof of the date and integrity of the backup kept.
ACC Organization. ACCs’ content is organized as {ET 1 , . . . , ET ` ,padding,
EW ′p,id}, where ET 1 is the encryption of the i-th transaction performed by an
ACC and ` is the number of transactions the performed through that particu-
lar ACC. We use padding to avoid any information leakage regarding `. This
modular form of encryption is necessary for each of the procedures mentioned
before to be able to be executed individually.
Computing power. Credit card customers in our system often lack in computing
sophistication: not all of them have or know how to install software able to
encrypt or decrypt text or verify the hashes used in our system. A solution on this
problem would be for the CIBs to provide their customers with special machines
dealing with card encryption/decryption issues. The extra cost of these devices
may be viewed by the cardholder as an extra price for her privacy.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed e-commerce Context Privacy. In particular, we pre-
sented a deployable credit card system which guarantees cardholder anonymity
and transaction unlinkability, even towards to Credit Card Associations or Card
Issuing Banks. At the same time, we have preserved many of the essential ben-
efits of credit cards. In special circumstances the transactions of a party may
be revealed but only with that party’s consent. Undeniably, there are still issues
to be dealt, such as password loss recovery and operational transparency with
respect to cardholders. However, we do believe that this paper is a good start for
privacy in current credit card systems.
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